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Abstract 
The correlation between foreign aid and democratization has a contentious history in the 
field of international affairs.  The paradigm that foreign aid can be used to achieve 
democratization in foreign political systems underscores to the centrality of democracy in 
Western societies. This thesis explores the relationship between foreign aid and 
democratization in sub-Saharan Africa.   
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Introduction 
 
The correlation between foreign aid and democratization has a contentious history 
in the field of international affairs.  The paradigm that foreign aid can be used to achieve 
democratization in foreign political systems underscores to the centrality of democracy in 
Western societies. This thesis explores the relationship between foreign aid and 
democratization in sub-Saharan Africa.  The research question is: What have been the 
consequences of foreign aid on democratization in Africa?  
To begin our discussion, the terms foreign aid and democracy must to be defined. 
Foreign aid is defined as “An international transfer of resources that would not have 
taken place as a result of market forces…it includes grants, and loans made at subsidized 
interest rates, provided by governments or by international finance institutions” 
(Goldsmith 2001, 412). Democracy can be characterized as a “Pluralistic national 
political system where people are reasonably free to express their political demands and 
to hold rulers to account” (Goldsmith 2001, 412).  Although multi-party elections are an 
indicator of democracy, they should not be taken as the only measure of democracy; 
ultimately, elections are necessary, yet insufficient in measuring democracy. 
Exploring the consequences of foreign aid on African democratization can be 
perplexing given the foreign aid policies of Western governments towards Africa.  Since 
the 1960s, specifically U.S. foreign aid policy has been rhetorically based upon the 
United States’ commitment to devote some of its wealth to combating human suffering 
around the world.  Prompted by the tenets of modernization theory, in 1961 President  
John Kennedy called for the creation the U.S. Agency for International Development 
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(USAID).  Subsequently, the U.S. Congress moved to ratify the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961, which established foreign assistance as a central component of U.S. foreign 
policy. Yet despite grandiose narratives of America’s commitment to promote economic 
development, and good governance worldwide, these ambitions became susceptible to the 
U.S. Cold War agenda.  Hence, historically, American foreign aid became nothing more 
than an extension of realpolitik policy objectives.   
Beginning with Ghana in 1957, as independence dawned across Africa, newly 
liberated African states found themselves the benefactors of American foreign aid. 
Moreover, aid was perceived by the Kennedy administration as essential in lifting newly 
independent territories out of poverty, making them less likely to undergo a communist 
revolution.  However, as the Cold War preceded American aid became a tool of 
persuasion for the United States.  African states that politically aligned with the West 
were rewarded with aid. It is from here that proxy contests between the United States and 
Soviet Union began to unfold across Africa.  
Moreover, when analyzing the United States allocation of aid to Africa it is 
essential to compare two chapters in America aid policy.  During the Cold War, the 
United States allocated aid based on the expressed ideological position of the recipient 
state.    This approach was often sold as protecting African states from communism; 
however, it proved to be quite detrimental to democracy. In many circumstances, this 
approach worked to maintain the powerful grip of non-democratic regimes.  
The second chapter of American foreign aid towards Africa was promoted by the 
end of the Cold War.   The fall of the Soviet Union gave way to a global wave of 
democratization.  During the 1990s the United States implemented foreign aid policies 
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that actively seek to promote democracy.  The 1990s is a significant decade for two 
reasons. First, it is during this decade that democracy assistance was adopted as a new 
foreign aid approach by the United States. Secondly, the 1990s signify America’s shift 
away from its Cold War approach to foreign aid, and United States foreign aid practices 
became consistent with America’s rhetorical narrative on aid.  During this chapter the 
United States strategically redirected aid from African dictators and tyrants, and 
reallocated it to civic initiatives mobilizing to remove these actors.  For the last 20 years 
foreign aid in the form of economic development assistance, humanitarian aid, and 
democracy assistance has flowed into African political economies, yet it is unclear 
whether this purposed capital has yielded its intended outcome.   
This paper hypothesizes that post-Cold War foreign aid has advanced 
democratization in Africa. The monograph is organized in three sections. The first section 
presents qualitative findings on the impact of foreign aid on democratization in Africa.  
In this section democratization is designated as the dependent variable.  To explain this 
variable, the study will put forth four explanatory variables: foreign aid, aid 
conditionality, international political trends, and democracy assistance.  Moreover, this 
section will address each explanatory variable with the review of scholarly literature that 
presents both quantitative and qualitative evidence relevant to the variable.   
From here the second section will broaden its attention to explore foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and its consequences on democratization.  The vast natural resources of 
Africa have caught the attention of foreign investors from emerging markets.  Most 
notably, the People’s Republic of China has invests heavily in African oil exploration.  
Chinese FDI is accompanied by infrastructure development aid for the recipient 
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government.  Proponents of Chinese involvement in Africa claim that FDI is more 
effective than foreign aid in helping African states realize their infrastructure 
development goal. This section will examine the validity of this claim, and whether 
Chinese FDI has advanced or hampered democratization in Africa.  
The third section will explore three political indexes and will compare sub-
Saharan ratings on these indexes against their official development assistance (ODA) as 
reported by the World Bank.  Official development assistance can be defined as “a net 
transfer in cash or kind that is administered with economic development in mind and that 
has a grant element of at least 25 percent” (Goldsmith 2001, 426).  Finally, the 
conclusion will address region specific challenges that impede democratization in Africa. 
This will take a panoramic view in analyzing the consequences of foreign assistance on 
democratization in Africa.  
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Explaining Democratization in Africa  
 
Foreign Aid  
Arthur A. Goldsmith in “Donor, Dictators, and Democrats in Africa” presents 
findings that demonstrate a corollary relationship between foreign aid and African 
democratization in the post-Cold War era.  Goldsmith cites three indicators of heightened 
political engagement in African political systems. First, Goldsmith notes that African 
counties are beginning to tolerate liberal-democratic norms of political participation 
(Goldsmith 2001, 418).   
 Second, the author notes an increase in the number of political contests held 
across Africa.  Specifically, Goldsmith notes that between 1990 and 2000, 78 political 
elections were collectively held by African States.  This is in stark contrast to the 126 
elections held between the years of 1960 to 1989.  Additionally, during the 1990s there 
were 21 opposition election victories across Africa, as opposed to the merely one 
opposition victory occurring between 1960 and 1989 (Goldsmith 2001, 422). Goldsmith 
also notes increased retirement of African heads of states.  He states, “The threat of 
losing an election also may account for the increasing rate of leader retirement-nine in the 
1990s versus only eight in the previous three decades” (Goldsmith 2001, 422).  
 Third, the score of African states on international indexes measuring political 
freedom rose during the 1990s.  Goldsmith cites the Freedom House index, and he notes 
that from 1989 to 1999 many African governments improved their mean index score 
from 2.4 to 3.6.  Additionally, he notes the Ted Robert Gurr Polity98 Project at the 
University of Maryland, which measured political openness. Within the Gurr index 41 
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sub-Saharan states received the mean sore of 3.0 in 1998 opposed to a score of 0.8 ten 
years earlier in 1989.  The index scores range from 0 to 10, with 10 designating most 
open (Goldsmith 2001, 425).  
Though Goldsmith presents convincing evidence that African states begin to 
implement democratic reforms in the 1990s, it is still unclear whether aid is consequential 
in the democratization of sub-Saharan states.   To address this concern, Goldsmith 
provides regression data to test 12 explanatory variables of Africa democratization.   
 
 
These explanatory variables include official development assistance, effective 
development assistance, gross domestic product per capita, urbanization, ethnic 
heterogeneity, religion, population, and land mass. The variables are tested against ODA, 
and effective development assistance (EDA)—“the sum of grants and grant equivalents 
of official loans”—for 10-year increments (Goldsmith 2001, 428).  Goldsmith’s findings 
present a monotonically positive regression relationship between democracy index scores  
Table 1 
Democracy in Africa, 1989 to 1999
a
   
 
  
Freedom House Index 
(1= least freedom, 7= most) 
 
Polity98 Index 
(0= least openness, 10=most) 
 
 
 
 
  1989                       1999 
 
   1989                           1998 
 
Mean Score 
 
Number of 
Countries 
   2.4                           3.6
a 
 
    47                            48 
  
     0.8                             3.0
a 
 
      41                              41 
 
Source: Goldsmith, Arthur. 2001. “Dictators and Democrats in Africa.” Journal of Modern African Studies 
Vol.39 No. 3 (September): 425.
 
a
99 percent confidence  
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and ODA and EDA.  Moreover, there was a statistical increase in the regression 
relationship between ODA and EDA and democracy index scores in the 1990s 
(Goldsmith 2001, 432).  The scholar also provided another measurement model to 
address concerns of endogeneity, and the positive relationship between aid and 
democratization remained.    
 Goldsmith concludes that there is a small, yet positive corollary relationship 
between foreign aid and African democratization.  He notes that donors post-Cold War 
aid allocation policies “can help boost the budding democratic movements” of sub-
Saharan countries, thus giving way for the initial phases of democratization (Goldsmith 
2001, 432).  Nevertheless, Goldsmith affirms that the work of democracy consolidation 
will only be achieved with local buy-in from citizens and African civil society.  
 A divergent assessment of the correlations between foreign aid and 
democratization in Africa is presented by Stephen Knack in “Does Foreign Aid Promote 
Democracy?”  Knack’s quantitative analysis is composed of a large sample of 102 and  
countries—33 of which are in sub-Saharan Africa—that have received foreign aid. His 
findings span 25-year period, with his data beginning in 1975 through 2000. Furthermore, 
the scholar notes the significance of 1975, as the year in which the U.S. Foreign 
Assistance Act was amended to incorporate Section 116, which conditioned the 
allocation of aid on the incorporation of civil liberties and the rule of law by recipient 
governments (Knack 2004, 252).  This was done in an effort to promote democracy and 
human rights.  Although conditions were placed on aid, Knack concludes “no evidence is 
found that aid promotes democracy” (Knack 2004, 251).  He acknowledges that his 
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findings do not prove that democracy programs are completely ineffective, but that 
instances of these programs’ success are limited and sporadic (Knack 2004, 251). 
 Knack’s quantitative findings are derived from states’ ratings on two democracy 
indexes: 1) the Freedom House Freedom in the World Index, a measure of level of 
political freedom and civil liberties, and 2) the Polity Index, a measure of how executive 
leadership is selected (Knack 2004, 254). To test the correlation between foreign aid and 
democratization, Knack creates a comparative regression between official development 
assistance, GDP and eight other indicators, among these being literacy, infant mortality, 
and population rates.  He argues: “If aid promotes democracy, then countries with higher 
aid levels should exhibit improving ratings on democracy indexes over time, other things 
equal” (Knack 2004, 256).  Knack eventually notes that both indexes show a clear trend 
towards democratization among the nations sampled; however, he does not attribute this 
to foreign aid but to a third wave of democratization triggered by fall of the Soviet Union. 
 Though Knack provides a quantitatively sound analysis of the effect of foreign aid 
on democracy, he neglects to address the international political circumstance of the time 
period in question, which arguably undercuts the soundness of his conclusion.  He 
references the significance of 1975 as the year the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act is 
amended to include Section 116.  However, Knack fails to address the circumstances of 
the international systems at this time, and more specifically that the United States and its 
Western allies are engaged in the Cold War.  Ultimately, though the promotion of 
democracy and human rights is addressed in Section 116, it was apparent that American 
aid policy did not fully implement this mandate in its aid allocation procedure.  Given 
that Knack’s evaluation of state ratings spans a 25-year period, his results have the 
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potential to be skewed.  Arguably this reality has led scholars like Goldberg to divide 
their findings in ten-year increments.  
 
Politically Conditioned Aid 
In “Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa,” Stephen 
Brown qualitatively examines the impact of conditioned foreign aid on the achievement 
of consolidated forms of democratic governance in sub-Saharan recipient states. Brown 
limits his findings to the decade of the 1990s.  He notes that the end of the Cold War 
initiated reforms in Western aid distribution policies.  It is during this time that donors 
begin to condition bilateral aid upon recipient states’ implementation of democratic 
political reforms. The most notable of aid conditions is the introduction of multiparty 
political participation and popular elections (Brown 2005, 182).  Prior to the 1990s 
several African political systems maintained constitutional statutes which outlawed the 
formation of opposition political parties, thereby creating a one-party political system.  
Known as African Democracy, political opponents to the state party were subjected to 
punitive repercussions under the law.   
Moreover, Brown concludes that the implementation of politically conditioned 
bilateral aid, though instrumental in providing democratic openings in sub-Sahara 
political systems, undermines democracy consolidation in African recipient states (Brown 
2005, 182).  To support his argument, Brown provides three examples.  
First, he notes that political parties in Western societies are formed around class 
or social interests, whereas in sub-Saharan societies political associations are primarily 
based upon ethnic identity. A rapid transition to multi-party democracy can often foment 
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ethnic rivalries for political control of state resources, thereby undermining the 
consolidation of democracy (Brown 2005, 183).  This assertion harkens back to the 
original justification for one-party African democracy.  In the years following 
independence, African autocrats evaded calls for multi-party politics, claiming that 
multiple political parties would give rise to tribalism.  They argued that political parties 
would be nothing more than vehicles leading to the fracturing of the electorate, thus 
giving rise to ethnic conflict and civil discord.   
Next, Brown claims that African states will find ways to evade political 
conditionality by making the minimum democratic reforms necessary to maintain their 
aid.  Brown notes many African autocrats have learned to “[Allow] opposing parties to 
compete, but not win; [to permit] an independent press to operate, but not freely; [and to 
allow] civic groups to function, but not effectively” (Brown 2005, 184).  Furthermore, by 
donors rewarding government actors for modest political reforms, they may undermine 
domestic actors mobilizing for more substantive democratic reform, thereby undermining 
democracy consolidation (Brown 2005, 188).  
Finally, Brown argues that donors tend to be initially involved in applying 
pressure onto recipient governments to allow multiparty elections and other forms of 
procedural democracy, but gradually democratization become secondary to other foreign 
policy goals such as economic liberalization.  Brown claims, “The U.S. has historically 
subordinated democracy promotion to its security interests, since democracy, contrary to 
current rhetoric, is not always perceived as serving U.S. interests” (Brown 2005, 189). 
Furthermore, based upon the argument, it can be logically inferred that politically 
conditioned bilateral aid, though promoting procedural democracy, can curtail the full 
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consolidation of democracy within the African recipient government. Brown concludes 
his article by advocating for the adoption of a gradual democratization process for 
African governments.  
 
Democracy Assistance: A New Type of  
The fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 brought about a stark shift in American aid 
policies. In the decade following the Cold War, the United States took the lead as the 
largest donor to democratization in foreign political systems.  In Aiding Democracy 
Abroad: The Learning Curve, Thomas Carothers discusses the evolution of democracy 
assistance aid.  Carothers characterizes democracy assistance as: “Aid specifically 
designed to foster a democratic opening in a non-democratic country or to further a 
democratic transition in a country that has experienced a democratic opening” (Carothers 
1999, 8).  From here, Carothers surveys the impact, outcomes, and limitations of 
democracy assistance.  As the Vice President of Global Policy at the Carnegie 
Endowment for Peace, Carothers provides a practitioner’s assessment of democracy 
assistance and its role as a relatively new approach in U.S. foreign assistance.  
 To begin his assessment, Carothers discusses what he terms the core strategy of 
democracy assistance, which includes three models of democratization: 1) democracy 
template; 2) political sequencing; and 3) institution modeling.  The goal of democracy 
promoters is to assess the democratic trajectory of a political system and then allocate aid 
resources in way that will result in instances of consolidation.  The core strategy provides 
democracy promoters with a guide for how to aid democratic transitions already 
underway in political systems.  However, Carothers notes that the desire by democracy 
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promoters to place political systems neatly into one of these models can lead to 
inflexibility. 
 The democracy template is composed of three stages of democracy assistance: 
elections, state institutions, and civil society.  When a democratic opening is achieved, 
democracy promoters initiate assistance by concentrating resources on the holding of 
“free and fair” popular elections.  Once an election is achieved, democracy assistance is 
then directed at state institutions; this is typically done by providing assistance to draft a 
constitution.  Carothers notes that along with establishing a government, a constitution 
should ideally provide for liberal governance in the form of separation of powers, rule of 
law, and the protection of civil and political rights (Carothers 1999, 87).  The final 
chapter of the democracy template is civil society. During this stage democracy 
promoters work to activate a vibrant civil society sector that advocates for citizens 
interests, as well as holds political leaders to account.  
 Building upon the democracy template, political sequencing is the second model 
of the core strategy.  Under this model, a political system has already achieved a political 
opening, and has elected a transitional government that is charged with instituting liberal  
 
political reforms forming a new democratic government.  With the initial political 
transition achieved, democracy assistance is directed at consolidation. Democracy 
promoters work to augment the “supply of democracy” provided by government 
institutions, as well as the “demand for democracy” by citizens (Carothers 1999, 87). 
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Institution modeling is the final model applied by democracy promoters, and it is 
the process of transforming the institutions in a transitional country to resemble state 
institutions in Western democracies.   To further expound on this point, Carothers notes:  
The self- assigned role of democracy assistance is to stimulate and speed up 
such institution modeling. Each project in the typical U.S. portfolio aims to 
shape a particular sector or institution along the lines of its counterpart in 
Western democracies.  This is why training is such a common method of 
democracy assistance (Carothers 1999, 90). 
 
The rationale for institution modeling is the naïve notion that if a political system can 
reproduce the institutional frameworks of Western states then it will inevitably achieve 
democracy (Carothers 1999, 90). 
From the core strategy, Carothers moves on to present four case studies of 
countries that have undergone democratic transitions in the 1990s.  He notes that each 
country had different government structures, which are representative of the region.  His 
cases represent the democratic transition witnessed during the third wave of democracy.  
Carothers also notes that the United States supported non-democratic regimes in all four 
countries, and eventually provided democracy assistance to each country.  These 
countries are: 1) Guatemala, a right-wing military dictatorship; 2) Nepal, a partyless 
monarchy; 3) Zambia, a single-party African democracy; and 4) Romania, a communist 
totalitarian dictatorship (Carothers 1999, 65).   
Despite their divergent political structures, Carothers asserts that each country  
shares three central characteristics.  First, democratic openings were prompted, in part, by 
democratization in other countries. Second, illiberal regimes were undermined by 
prolonged economic distress. Third, each country witnessed popular mobilization for 
democratic reforms.  Moreover, each of the four countries has encountered difficulty in 
consolidating their democracy. This reality leads Carothers to state: “All four countries 
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point up a critical difficulty of democratization: transforming state institutions into 
competent, effective entities.  In all four, most of the core state institutions have remained 
citadels of corruption, incompetence, and inefficiency throughout the process” (Carothers 
1999, 81).  
 
 It is from the case studies that Carothers presents four assessments of the 
prospects and limitations of democracy assistance.  First, in political systems where 
democratization is advancing, democracy assistance can have a useful, though minor, role 
in advancing the transition. Second, in political systems where democratization has 
become stagnant, or even begun to backslide, democracy assistance initiatives are 
unlikely to put the system back on track.  Carothers claims democracy programs at most 
can support pockets of reform to help maintain some political opening (Carothers 1999, 
341). Third, in non-democratic political systems with no signs of a democratic opening, 
assistance is limited to promoting a democratic vanguard. Finally, in political systems 
that are trending towards authoritarian governance, democracy aid may support civic 
initiatives advocating against the trend; nevertheless, aid is not a sufficient substitute for 
these forces.  Carothers concludes by stating: “No dramatic results should be expected 
from democracy promotion efforts.” He continues to say, “Democracy promotion must 
be approached as a long-term, uncertain venture” (Carothers 1999, 351).  
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Source: Carothers, Thomas. 1999. Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve. Washington: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace: 88. 
 
Sector Sector Goal Type of Aid 
Electoral Process   Free and fair elections  
 
Strong national  
political parties 
Electoral aid 
 
Political party building 
 
State Institutions 
 
Democratic constitution 
 
Independent, effective 
judiciary and other law-
oriented institutions 
 
Competent, 
representative legislature 
 
Responsive local  
government 
 
Pro-democracy military 
 
Constitution assistance 
 
Rule-of-law aid 
 
 
 
Legislative strengthening 
 
 
Local government 
development 
 
Civil-military relations 
 
Civil Society 
 
Active advocacy NGOs 
 
Politically educated 
citizenry 
 
Strong independent 
media 
 
Strong independent  
unions 
 
NGO building 
 
Civic education 
 
 
Media strengthening 
 
 
Union building 
Table 2 
The Democracy Template 
___________________________________________________________ 
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Supporting Civil Society 
The significance of civil society in democracy assistance is addressed by Julie 
Hearn and Mark Robinson in “Civil Society and Democracy Assistance in Africa.” In 
their analysis, Hearn and Robinson present three schools of thought regarding civil 
society.  The first two schools are associated with Northern notions on civic associational 
life, while the third school presents a contemporary concept of civil society as 
experienced in Southern political systems.    
The Tocqueville school defines civil society as: “The sphere of associational life, 
in which citizens organize themselves into horizontal associations and networks that cut 
across and transcend traditional social relationships founded on patron-client ties” (Hearn 
and Robinson year, 242).  Next, the Locke school conceptualizes civil society as a check 
on an authoritarian state, where citizens mobilize to enlarge the political sphere while 
advocating for the protection of their political and civil rights (Hearn and Robinson year, 
242).  Finally, the Marxist school serves as the foundation for contemporary thought on 
civil society in African political systems.  Within this school, emphasis is placed on 
citizens’ associational behavior in the economic sphere, as opposed to the public sphere.   
In the context of Africa, this school identifies three competing civil societies: a 
“predatory state elite; an ‘aspiring bourgeoisie’; and a popular civil society” (Hearn and 
Robinson year, 243).  Under this framework citizen organization in the public sphere is 
used as a means to obtain economic influence.  
 From here Hearn and Robinson explore three African states: Ghana, Uganda, and 
South Africa. Their findings from these case studies lead to them to identify three 
common trends in democracy assistance to civil society. First, they found that donors 
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favored civil society organization (CSOs) that supported economic and political 
liberalization. Next, Hearn and Robinson state that donor support is typically targeted at 
CSOs in urban areas that are led by middle-class elites.  Finally they state that CSOs have 
grown rapidly in many countries, and are primarily supported by foreign aid, thus 
rendering them susceptible to the externally imposed donor agendas.  Moreover, these 
findings lead Hearn and Robinson to conclude: “While donor funding to civil society 
organizations has helped to strengthen the legitimacy of democratic political institutions, 
the concentration of financial resources on a relatively narrow group of recipient 
organizations restrict democratic debate and political participation” (Hearn and Robinson 
year, 259). 
 In Africa, urban centers are disproportionately capital cities, and thus the centers 
of government.  It is questionable whether CSOs working for democratic causes can 
effectively execute their activities outside of urban centers; also infrastructural 
impediments are rampant in rural settings outside of cities.  Additionally, the depiction of 
middle-class elites is also wanting of further clarification.  Historically, the middle class 
has been the primary advocate for democratic reform.  The reality that African CSOs are 
led by middle-class elites is endemic in political systems globally. It points to the fact that 
these elites may be more effective in leading the charge for democratic reform than 
citizens living below the poverty line.   
 The authors’ assertion that Northern donors disproportionately support CSOs that 
align with economic liberalization is valid.  But it would be a “slippery-slope” to attribute 
these funding tendencies to the Northern-donor community at large.  Organizations like 
the Soros Open Society Foundation are resoundingly forthright about their mission to 
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promote liberal democratic reforms, specifically in African locations.  Finally, African 
CSOs’ susceptibility to foreign agendas is also a valid assertion.  In addition, African 
CSOs’ heavy reliance on Northern donors presents sustainability dilemmas for these 
organizations.  Nevertheless, despite these systemic realities of African civil society, 
Hearn and Robinson duly note the overall positive impact of democracy assistance to the 
organization of civil society.    
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                                               China in Africa 
 
            The People’s Republic of China’s 21st century return to Africa has been met with 
a great deal of skepticism and foreboding by Western governments.  Foreign policy 
institutes, based in the United States and Western Europe, have heightened their scrutiny 
of Chinese ambitions for an ever-increasing role in African states.  Claims depicting 
China’s growing economic role in Africa as counterproductive to democratization and 
development are made against China.  It is against this metanarrative that China seeks to 
project itself as the antithesis to Western aid institutions, and thus an ideal partner to 
developing African states.  Sino-African relations have primarily consisted of inflows of 
Chinese foreign direct investment into resource-rich countries. 
 Foreign direct investment (FDI) is defined as, “An investment made to acquire 
lasting interest in enterprises operating outside the economy of the investor...[T]he 
investor’s purpose is the gain an effective voice in the management of the 
enterprise”(United Nations 2002).  The World Trade Organization specifies three 
primary categories of FDI: 1) equity capital, 2) reinvest earnings, and 3) other capital, 
which is mainly in the form of intra-company loans (World Trade Organization 1996, 
57).  Whereas foreign aid is capital flows from external entities that cannot be 
explained by market forces, FDI is motivated by profitable returns on investment.  To 
be specific, when British Petroleum invests in oil exploration in Gabon, it does so with 
the intention of receiving a return on its investment, and to obtain an equity stake in oil 
discoveries made from its financed explorations.  Conversely, foreign aid institutions 
allocate revenue without the expectation of a financial return, with aid primarily 
provided to advance economic, political and human development. 
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Sino-Africa Relations 
Prior to the late 1990s, China’s relations with Africa, to a great degree, 
resembled the inward-outward dichotomy that has characterized Chinese foreign 
relations throughout history.  During the 1960s and 1970s China stood in solidarity 
with liberation movements throughout Africa.  Given China’s experience with British 
colonial occupation, the People’s Republic of China rhetorically supported 
revolutionary elements in various African counties.  China’s claims of solidarity with 
African liberation movements were primarily symbolic.  
 It was not until the Sino-Soviet split in 1961 that China sought enhanced 
relations with newly liberated African states.   Following the Sino-Soviet split, China 
become concerned about its isolation from the West and the East, and began to carry 
out aid-based diplomacy partnerships with friendly sub-Saharan states.  In 1963, 
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai led China’s first high-level delegation tour to Africa 
(Segal 1992, 117).  From there, the Chinese implemented a military aid program to 
assist national liberation movements.  Chinese military aid took the form of combat 
training, arms, and revenue (Segal 1992, 118).   
In 1970, China embarked on its first large-scale aid project in Africa, where it 
constructed the Tanzanian-Zambia railway.  Initially, President Julius Nyerere of 
Tanzania, and President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia had sought financing through the 
World Bank, and other Western financial institutions. The World Bank rejected the 
railroad project as uneconomical.  In 1965 the project was brought to Chairman Mao 
Tse-tung, who approved the project allocating up to $1 billion to the project’s 
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completion.  Within a year of financing the Tanzanian-Zambia Railway, China replaced 
Great Britain as Tanzania’s primary trading partner (Segal 1992, 118). 
 Throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s, China’s policy remained a dual 
approach of rhetorical solidarity combined with financial support for African liberation 
campaigns.  Moreover, the Western backlash from the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
massacre reinforced China’s alignment with its African partners.  China continues to 
demonstrate benevolence in exchange for its African allies’ loyalty in multilateral 
organizations like the United Nations.  In “China’s Engagement in Africa: Scope, 
Significance and Consequences,” Denis Tull notes that in the aftermath of the 1989 
Tiananmen Square massacre,  “Developing counties were effectively elevated to a 
‘cornerstone’ of Chinese foreign policy in an effort to build coalitions to shield Beijing 
from western criticism” (Tull 2006, 461).  It was through its cornerstone strategy that 
China addressed the Western backlash.  Through the 1990s China steadily re-emerged 
as an ascending global leader.  
 In turning his attention to Chinese policies during in the 1990s, Tull points to 
three primary factors that shape China’s foreign policy during this decade.  He argues 
that these laid the foundation for China’s aggressive economic policies in developing 
states.  First, China’s need to shield itself from international outcries prompted it to 
build greater solidarity among African states.   Moreover, the Chinese portray U.N. 
sanctions as another hegemonic infringement by the North into the domestic affairs of a 
Southern state (Tull 2006, 461).  Given the history of colonialism and that Africa is 
home to heinous authoritarian leaders, Chinese propaganda of being bullied by the 
West resonated with many African heads of state.  
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 Second, China’s increasingly active foreign policy approach was within a 
context of growing fear of an unchecked America. The end of the Cold War left the 
United States the dominant super power.  The Chinese perceive America’s unbridled 
hegemony as a threat to its ascent in global leadership (Tull 2006, 461).  This reality 
prompted China to increase its advocacy for multi-polarity by seeking to construct 
“flexible alliances to contain every form of hegemony and build a new and just 
international order” (Tull 2006, 461). 
 Third, Chinese leadership saw the pursuit of a foreign policy agenda as 
becoming increasingly necessary for China’s survival.  The Asian financial crisis of 
1997 demonstrated how international events could have implications for the 
Communist Party’s domestic political interests.  Tull asserts: 
The financial crisis in Asia in 1997 alerted the Chinese leadership to the 
risks of economic interdependence as it exposed the vulnerability of the 
country’s outward-oriented economy to externals shocks. By implication, 
regional and international stability, mainly but not exclusively in economic 
terms, turned into strategic objectives (Tull 2006, 461).  
 
These three factors, coupled with high population density, led China once again to 
Africa in pursuit of advantageous political relationships, sustainable energy sources, 
and access to raw materials.   
 
Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Africa 
The turn of the 21st century marks the beginning of a new chapter in Sino-
African relations.  China prompted by the realities of its own development and growth 
agenda revamped its foreign policy towards Africa, where it began to pursue pragmatic 
investment policies in sub-Saharan countries.  In “Friends and Interests: China’s 
Distinctive Links with Africa,” Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong present two FDI 
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approaches of the Chinese that are distinct from the FDI policies of Western states and 
transnational corporations.  These policy approaches are: the Chinese Model, and the 
Beijing Consensus.  Sautman and Hairong claim that under these two approaches 
Chinese transnational corporations, and the People’s Republic of China as a whole, are 
better positioned to reap the benefits of FDI partnerships with African states.  They also 
assert that Africa stands to benefit greatly from Chinese FDI as well.  
 Under the Chinese Model, China’s investment in sectors of strategic importance 
to China is combined with aid programs to African states.  Often Chinese aid is 
allocated to infrastructure projects. The Sautman and Hairong claim: 
Chinese bids for resources fare well because they are packaged with 
investment and infrastructure loans. China preeminently invests ‘in 
longer-neglected infrastructure projects and hardly viable industries’, and 
its loans, typically advance at zero or near-zero interest, are often repaid 
in natural resources, if they are not canceled entirely (Sautman and 
Hairong 2007, 80). 
 
The Chinese model is in stark contrast to Western foreign aid initiatives such as 
structural adjustment loans, which require recipient states to implement systemic 
economic reforms in exchange for needed loan revenue.  China, by contrast, provides 
“no-strings attached aid” to the African states that have valuable natural resources.    
In analyzing the Chinese model, China’s overwhelming investment in African 
oil and rare earths is quite apparent. Chinese energy firms have invested heavily in 
exploratory projects, most notably in Angola and Sudan, as well as other African states 
with high levels of political instability or with newly discovered oil reserves.  Chinese 
oil companies are acknowledged as being less risk adverse than their Western 
counterparts, and more willing to go to politically volatile areas and invest heavily in 
oil discovery projects that have a low initial return (Tull 2006, 468). This can be 
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attributed to two factors. First, China’s major oil companies are owned by the Chinese 
government (Tull 2006, 469).  Unlike privately owned Western oil companies, Chinese 
oil companies are subsidized by the state.  This works in the Chinese favor, and 
provides oil companies with the leverage to invest in oil exploration in political hot 
spots throughout Africa.  Should political stability be restored, China is then left with 
privileged access to the oil supply of the country.  Tull affirms this by stating:  
Thanks to their willingness to take significant risks, Chinese firms are able 
to derive huge profits from rates of return on foreign direct investment, 
said to be much higher in politically volatile sub-Saharan Africa than in 
other parts of the developing world (Tull 2006, 468). 
 
A second factor is that Chinese oil companies are commissioned to secure 
privileged access that will help support China’s increasing demand for oil. Moreover, 
since these companies are government owned they are an extension of the state, and 
ultimately, can afford the risk in the area of oil discovery, because secured access to 
these oil resources is the anticipated return.  
In turning to the Beijing Consensus, Sautman and Hairong, present it as a 
competing framework to the Washington Consensus.  The central tenet of the Beijing 
consensus is China’s unrelenting adherence to state sovereignty. Moreover, China has 
maintained a non-interference policy in its investment relations with its African 
partners.  From the perspective of the Chinese, its economic relations with African 
states are strictly business relationships. It should be noted that the PRC maintains its 
non-interference policy regardless of the state political structure (i.e., liberal democratic 
or authoritarian).  
China’s non-interference policy is in direct contrast to the Washington 
Consensus, made up of the IMF, World Bank, and other Western funding organization, 
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which places conditions on loans. Through its non-interference policies, China 
appeases African states’ calls for greater autonomy and has contributed to China being 
hailed as the ideal development partner by some African policymakers.  It should be 
noted that China has suspended its non-intervention policy when its economic or 
security policies are at risk.  
 A good example of China’s non-intervention policy is its policy towards Sudan.  
In 1996, China acquired a 40 percent ownership stake in Greater Nile Petroleum 
Operating Company, Sudan’s oil production and exploration company.  It is estimated 
that China has invested nearly $5 dollars in its oil enterprise in Sudan (Tull 2006, 470).   
As acts of genocide being carried out by Khartoum against Southern Sudanese in the 
Darfur region of the country were brought to international attention, China refused to 
acknowledge the situation as a humanitarian crisis, but rather called it an “internal 
issue.”  China did not adhere to  international sanctions on Sudanese oil, and in 2004 
used its position on the U.N. Security Council to block any Security Council actions 
against Khartoum.   
The refusal of China to relent to international pressures on the Darfur genocide 
left China as  the only importer of Sudanese oil.  Tull argues that China’s opposition to 
U.N. sanctions against Sudan “perpetuated a highly advantageous status quo” (Tull 
2006, 470).  He notes: “The peace agreements between Khartoum and the rebels of the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army of January 2005 contain an explicit guarantee for all 
oil concessions which the Sudanese state has granted during the war” (Tull 2006, 470).  
Sudan is just one example of China’s willingness to partner with pariah states to 
advance its energy security policies.  
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Another strategic component of the Beijing Consensus is the use of bilateral 
trade agreements with African states to advance Chinese export interests.  China has 
strategically circumvented African multilateral and regional trade commissions and 
insists on entering into trade agreements with individual states (Adem 2010, 354-55).  
African markets present China with a lucrative opportunity to heavily export 
inexpensive consumer goods to developing African states.  Often, trade agreements are 
included in Chinese FDI contracts, thereby opening the door to Chinese exports to 
African markets. Although, African states have the option to export their commodities 
to China, these products are at a disadvantage in competing with Chinese commodities 
in China’s domestic markets.  
Through its development partnerships with Africa, China has also taken 
advantage of programs meant to aid Africa. One such program is the United States’ 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of 2000, which granted African textiles 
preferred access to American markets.  The Chinese textile industry was ultimately 
disadvantaged by AGOA.  This caused Chinese textiles companies to relocate their 
factories to African locations.  Once the AGOA ended in 2005, Chinese textiles 
companies relocated back to China, leaving tens of thousands of textile workers in 
South Africa, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and Kenya unemployed (Tull 2006, 472).  
 
Evaluating the outcomes of Sino-African Relations 
The unfulfilled promise of Chinese foreign direct investment to bring increased 
employment opportunities for Africans is becoming a growing concern for African 
states.  Although Chinese investment in African infrastructure projects has increase 
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construction jobs in many sub-Saharan cities, migrant labor from China is primarily 
used in infrastructure projects.  In the case of Angola, one of China’s primary oil 
suppliers, migrant workers have been brought to Angola to complete its infrastructure 
projects.  Tull claims: 
China’s hard-nosed economic interests are also reflected in Angola, 
where some 2,500 Chinese workers have arrived to work for Chinese 
companies whose work will be financed by the oil-backed loans that 
Beijing granted to the Angolan government. According to one source, a 
total of 30,000 Chinese workers are expected eventually in Angola (Tull 
2006, 473). 
 
Given China’s economic superiority it is difficult to ascertain whether African 
states as a whole will truly benefit from Chinese economic policies.  Although the 
Chinese model to foreign investment, which combines investment with desperately 
needed infrastructure aid, provides a promising opportunity to African states, it is 
questionable whether the benefits of these programs are undermined by other aspects of 
China’s economic policy.  In the case of Angola, Chinese requirements that contracts 
for infrastructure projects be awarded to Chinese companies, which rely heavily upon 
Chinese migrant labor, undermines the development of a modern African labor force.   
Granted, China, like any other international actor, is protecting its economic interests as 
it should. However, this reality should be kept in mind when China claims that its 
agenda is best for Africa.   
 The political ramifications of Chinese economic policy are detrimental to Africa 
democratization.  The Chinese protection of pariah states, under the guise of non-
interference policies, is dangerous for African political development and may present 
unintended ramifications for China’s economic interests in Africa.  In addition, as 
China rises in global power, the Chinese may find it increasingly difficult to pursue a 
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policy of non-interference.  Furthermore, like most international actors, China will 
begin to weigh the cost and benefits of involving itself in the political affairs of its 
African partners.  China, like  many Western states, may pursue non-interference as it 
advances its foreign policy interests.  However, China will not hesitate to change its 
policy towards African sovereignty should its investments be threatened.  
In “Towards a Critical Geopolitics of China’s Engagement With African 
Development,” Marcus Powers and Giles Mohan assert: 
The Chinese are themselves well aware that their non-interference stance 
is untenable in Africa.  Given that the economic relationship matters to 
China, its government has a vest interest in long-term stability…(Power 
and Mohan 2010, 482). 
 
China’s desire for peace in Africa is apparent in its involvement in U.N. peacekeeping 
missions, particularly in Liberia.  During the Liberian civil war, China continued to 
purchase Liberian timber despite mounting international pressure to end trade with the 
state.  It was the revenue from timber sales that kept the warlord regime of Liberian 
president Charles Taylor in office.  However, after Taylor left office, China 
participated in an UN peacekeeping mission to restore order to the war-torn state.  
China apparently sought to demonstrate its continued support for the Liberian 
government while attempting to circumvent any  international backlash from its 
relations with Taylor’s regime.  China’s peacekeeping mission to Liberia presents an 
example of how China is increasingly implementing a policy of selective non-
interference (Power and Mohan 2010, 482).  It should be noted that this is a policy 
practiced by many states in the international system.  
 China’s oil investment policies in war-torn, resource-rich countries embolden 
authoritarian regimes.   Resource-rich countries in Africa are some of the societies 
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hardest hit by war and humanitarian crises because of constant conflict for control over 
natural resources.  China’s investment in these areas, in an attempt to advance its 
resource security agenda, has had devastating consequences for these countries and 
their neighbors.  For example, in the instance of Sudan, proceeds from Chinese oil 
investment potentially were used to perpetrate acts of genocide against the South 
Sudanese.  
The analysis of Chinese-African relations has explored the opportunities, as 
well as the shortcomings, of Chinese FDI in Africa.  It must be noted that the policy 
approach implemented by China is not different from approaches utilized by Western 
governments during the high stakes Cold War era.  Although China presents African 
states with opportunities for growth and infrastructure development, these opportunities 
are aimed at primarily profiting the Chinese, which legitimately falls within the Chinese 
national interests.  Although Chinese FDI is presented as a promising alternative to 
foreign aid, it is apparent that Chinese investments hold adverse implications for 
democratization and may potentially perpetuate the political circumstances that lead to 
state failure in Africa.  Though the People’s Republic of China portrays itself as an 
ideal development partner for African countries, its policies make it poised to take up 
the role of neo-colonial actor in sub-Saharan political economies.  
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Empirical Findings 
 
Origins of the Data 
            The Freedom House Foundation is an American-based public policy institute.  
Since 1972, Freedom House has published an annual index that measures the global level 
of political freedom and civil liberty.  The Freedom in the World Index provides an in-
depth survey of the level of political and civil freedom enjoyed by the individual in a 
country.  The political rights rating is determined by three factors: the electoral process, 
political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of government.  Additionally, 
the civil liberty rating is determined by freedom of expression and belief, associational 
and organization rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights.   
Countries are rated on a scale of 1 to 7 by the Freedom in the World Index.  A 
rating of 1 signifies the highest level of freedom, while a 7 signifies the lowest level of 
freedom.  The following overall freedom statuses: Free (F), Partially Free (PF), and Not 
Free (NF), are determined by the country’s political rights and civil liberty rating.  The 
freedom status is attained by averaging the political rights and civil liberty scores.  An 
average of 1.0 to 2.5 is free; 3.0 to 5.0 is partially free; and 5.5 to 7 is not free.  The 
Freedom House Foundation contends that the status of free does not signify that a country 
is perfectly free or without serious political problems, but rather that a free state enjoys 
more liberal democratic freedoms compared to a partially free state.  The following table 
provides the 10-year aggregate ratings of African countries states on the Freedom in the 
World Index.  
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Table 3  
Ten-Year Aggregate score (2001 - 2011)       
Country  
Political 
Rights 
Civil 
Liberties Status 
Angola 6 5.1 NF 
Benin 2.2 2 F 
Botswana 2.2 2 F 
Burkina Faso 5.2 3.4 PF 
Cameroon 6 6 NF 
Cape Verde 1.1 1.2 F 
Central African Republic 5.3 4.8 PF 
Chad 6.4 5.5 NF 
Congo (Brazzaville) 5.6 4.6 PF 
Congo (Kinshasa) 5.8 6 NF 
Cote d'Ivoire 6.2 5.4 NF 
Djibouti 4.9 5 PF 
Equatorial Guinea 6.9 6.3 NF 
Eritrea 7 7.4 NF 
Ethiopia 5.1 5.1 PF 
Gabon 5.6 4.4 PF 
Gambia, The 5.1 4.7 PF 
Ghana 1.4 2.2 F 
Guinea 6.1 5.1 NF 
Guinea-Bissau 4.1 4.2 PF 
Kenya 3.8 3.4 PF 
Lesotho 2.4 3.1 F* 
Liberia 4.2 4.6 PF 
Madagascar 3.8 4.4 PF 
Malawi 4.1 3.8 PF 
Mali 2 2.6 F 
Mauritania 5.5 5.1 PF 
Mauritius 1 1.8 F 
Mozambique 3.2 3.6 PF 
Namibia 2 1.4 F 
Niger 3.7 3.7 PF 
Nigeria 4.2 4.2 PF 
Rwanda 6.2 5.1 NF 
Sao Tome & Principe 1.8 2 F 
Senegal 2.4 3.1 F* 
Seychelles 3.3 3 PF 
Sierra Leone 3.6 3.3 PF 
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Somalia 6.5 7 NF 
South Africa 1.5 1.8 F 
Sudan 7 7 NF 
Swaziland 6.8 5 NF 
Tanzania 4 3.1 PF 
Togo 5.5 4.8 PF 
Uganda 5.2 4.1 PF 
Zambia 3.6 3.9 PF 
Zimbabwe 6.5 6 NF 
 Source: Freedom House Foundation. “Freedom in the World: Aggregate and Subcategory Scores.” 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-aggregate-and-subcategory-scores.  
 
An analysis of the status of African countries on the Freedom House Index 
suggests that sub-Saharan countries consistently are rated as partially free.  Twenty-five 
countries are listed as partially free; 13 countries have the status of not free, while only 
eight African countries are acknowledged as free.  An examination of the African 
countries ratings from 2001 to 2011 is significant because it marks the decade after the 
initial implementation of aid conditionality and the development of democracy assistance 
as a field in foreign aid.  Moreover, the disproportionate amount of partially free states in 
Africa substantiates the conclusions of Goldsmith, Carothers and Brown that democracy 
consolidation is an arduous long-term endeavor. Furthermore, despite the best intentions 
of Western democracy promoters, the impetus for liberal democratic consolidation in 
African countries must come from local actors.  
 
United States Aid Recipients in Africa  
            In turning to country-specific aid allocation practices, the following table captures 
the leading African recipients of U.S. assistance.  These figures are based on the U.S. 
Congressional budget request submitted by USAID. There is a noticeable heterogeneity 
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in the freedom levels of countries the United States aids.  In fact, six of the countries are 
free, while 14 are partially free, and eight are not free.  Additionally, it appears that aid 
by the United States is region-selective, such that five of the top 10 USAID recipients are 
located in East Africa. These countries are: Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and 
Sudan.   
Table 4  
Leading U.S. Assistance Recipients in Africa 
($ in millions) 
 
Country 
FY 2012 
Requested 
FY 2011 
Actual 
FY 2010 
Actual 
FY 2009 
Actual 
Uganda 
a 527.7 456.1 456.8 404.1 
Kenya 
a 751.4 661.8 687.6 829.4 
South Africa 
a 561.9 571.1 577.5 544.8 
Nigeria 
a 660.4 632.3 614.1 594.2 
Zambia 
a 400.7 385.0 392.9 308.1 
Ethiopia 
a 608.3 519.0 533.2 864.8 
Tanzania 
a 571.8 501.7  462.5 646.9 
Sudan 518.2 400.2 427.7 924.1 
Mozambique 
a 424.5 386.6 386.9 317.9 
Somalia 82.3 98.4 133.8 403.8 
Liberia 211.4 203.1 226.1 224.0 
Rwanda 
a 241.3 220.7 208.1 195.8 
Namibia 
a 99.6 103.2 102.8 112.0 
Botswana 
a 71.8 75.4 77.3 81.4 
Mali 171.7 137.7 117.8 102.6 
Dem. Rep. 
Congo 
261.8 215.9 183.0 296.5 
Ghana 204.5 165.8 138.8 147.5 
Malawi 201.6 169.7 145.7 115.6 
Senegal 119.8 98.7 106.3 93.7 
Cote d’Ivoire a 142.4 108.0 133.6 113.7 
Madagascar
 78.8 71.6 86.4 71.0 
Angola 27.8 60.9 84.2 55.9 
Guinea 13.6 25.0 22.0 13.3 
Benin 29.1 31.0 36.4 30.9 
Guinea 13.6 25.0 22.0 13.3 
Benin 29.1 31.0 36.4 30.9 
Zimbabwe 109.9 97.3 89.0 292.3 
Djibouti 7.3 8.5 9.4 5.8 
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Source: Ted Dagne, 2011. “Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues.” Congressional Research Services. 
               
a
  Global AIDS Initiative “Focus” Country.  
 
Two factors account for the concentration of USAID assistance in East Africa.  
First, this region in Africa is prone to terrorist activity.  In 1998, al-Qaeda terrorist attacks 
were simultaneously carried out against two U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania.  Additionally, state failure in Sudan and Somalia has made the Horn of 
Africa a hotbed of terrorist activity, which is evident in the heightened instances of piracy 
occurring along the coasts of the Indian Ocean.  The United States provides security 
assistance to the region for counterterrorism operations and supports the African Crisis 
Response Initiative (ACRI) in its training of African armies for peacekeeping missions 
(Dagne 2011, 4).  Second, state failure in Somalia and Sudan has brought about a 
humanitarian crisis within the region. Countries like Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia have 
been overwhelmed with migrant refugee populations, and this humanitarian crisis has 
resulted in USAID assistance. 
 
Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Africa 
Accurately identifying African recipients of Chinese FDI is difficult given the 
lack of transparency by the Chinese.  This reality is addressed by Thomas Lum, Specialist 
in Asian Affairs for the Congressional Research Service.  In his analysis, Lum employs a 
study conducted by the Wagner Graduate School of New York University.  The study 
examines eight African countries; it reports their primary export to China, along with the 
Sierra Leone 22.7 19.4 31.1 20.0 
Burundi  37.6 35.6 40.4 39.4 
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type of aid pledged to the African recipient country, and finally the purpose of the 
pledged aid.  All of the countries studied exported natural resources to China. These 
exported resources are either in the form of oil, minerals, or raw materials. 
 
Table 5 
 Selected African Countries with Large Reported Aid and Investment Projects,  
2002 - 2007 
 
Country  Main Export to 
China 
Pledged Aid, 
Loans, Credit 
Lines, and 
Investment 
Major Types of 
Financing (as 
Reported) 
Major Types of 
Projects Financed 
(as Reported) 
Angola
 a b c 
Oil $7.4 billion Loans, interest-
free loans, credit 
lines 
 
Infrastructure 
(railways) 
Congo (DRC) 
a 
b c
 
Oil, Minerals $5 billion Loans Infrastructure, 
mining 
 
Sudan 
 
Oil $4.2 billion Investment, 
loan, grants 
Oil refining, 
infrastructure, hydro 
power, humanitarian 
 
Gabon 
d
 Oil, minerals $3 billion Investment, 
Grants 
Iron ore mining, 
infrastructure, port 
facilities, hydro 
power 
 
Mozambique
 
Wood, ores $2.4 billion Debt 
cancellation, 
concessional 
loans, grants 
Dam construction, 
infrastructure, 
national stadium  
 
Equatorial Guinea 
b c 
 
Oïl $ 2 billion  Concessional 
loans, credit 
lines 
Not specified 
 
 
Ethiopia
 
Oil drilling 
rights 
$2 billion 
(includes 2008 
aid of $150 
million) 
Loans, grants, 
investment 
Infrastructure, 
telecommunications, 
public buildings, 
hydropower, light 
industry 
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Source: New York University, Wagner School. “Understanding Chinese Foreign Aid: A look at China’s 
Development Assistance to Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America, April 25, 2008.” 
a. Major African Trading Partner of China 
b. Loan Payment in Oil 
c. Major Africa Oil Supplier of China 
d. Loan payment in minerals 
 
 
 
Comparative study of Chinese FDI Recipients and USAID Recipients 
This paper’s fundamental hypothesis is that African states receiving Chinese FDI 
and aid will be disproportionately evaluated to be non-democratic, whereas states 
receiving USAID and World Bank assistance will be deemed more democratic.  To test 
my hypothesis, I will analyze the consequence of USAID and Chinese assistance on 
democratization in Africa. Concretely, I will compare the freedom status of the recipients 
of Chinese FDI and infrastructure aid to that of the recipients of USAID and World Bank 
assistance.  I will show that Sudan is an example of how Chinese assistance in the form 
of FDI and loans in exchange for access to oil has undermined humanitarian assistance by 
USAID and the World Bank.   
 
Nigeria 
a b 
 
Oil $1.6 billion Debt 
cancellation, 
investments, 
grants 
Off shore oil 
development, 
infrastructure 
(railways), medical 
training 
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Table 6   
Chinese FDI & Aid vs. USAID &World Bank 
 
C
h
in
e
se
  
F
D
I 
&
 A
id
 
 
Democratic States 
 
Non-Democratic States 
 
 Gabon (PF:5) 
 Ethiopia (PF:5.1) 
 Mozambique (PF:3.4) 
 Nigeria (PF:5.1) 
 
 Angola (NF:5.55) 
 Democratic Republic of 
Congo (NF:5.9) 
 Sudan (NF:7) 
 Equatorial Guinea (NF:6.6) 
 
U
S
A
ID
 &
 W
o
rl
d
 B
a
n
k
 
 
 Uganda (PF:4.64) 
 Kenya (PF:3.6) 
 South Africa (F:1.65) 
 Tanzania (PF:3.55) 
 Zambia (PF:3.75) 
 Nigeria (PF:5.1) 
 Ethiopia (PF:5.1) 
 Mozambique (PF:3.4) 
 Liberia (PF:4.4) 
 Namibia (F:1.7) 
 Botswana (F:2.1) 
 Mali (F:2.3) 
 Ghana (F:1.8) 
 Malawi (PF:3.95) 
 Senegal (PF:2.75) 
 Madagascar (PF:4.1) 
 Benin (F:2.1) 
 Djibouti (PF:4.9) 
 Sierra Leone (PF:3.45) 
 Burundi (PF:4.3) 
 
 
 Sudan (NF:7) 
 Somalia (NF:6.75) 
 Rwanda (NF:5.65 
 Democratic Republic of 
Congo (NF:5.9) 
 Angola (NF:5.55) 
 Guinea (NF:5.6) 
 Cote d’Ivoire (NF:5.8) 
 Zimbabwe (NF:6.25)  
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 China’s non-interference approach to aid allocation provides recipient countries 
with an alternative to Western donors as well as Western lending institutions.  
Unfortunately, the provision of unconditioned aid to an African government has been 
observed to have adverse ramifications to the level of freedom and democracy in the 
recipient country. For example, both Ethiopia and Gabon experienced a decline following 
the receipt of unconditioned aid from China; such that the freedom status of both 
countries rapidly declined from partially free in 2009 to not free in 2010 and 2011.  No 
government receiving Chinese aid saw an increase in its freedom status.  In contrast, 
USAID recipients like Burundi, Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone were elevated from 
the status of not free to partially free during 2001 to 2011. Additionally, only one USAID 
or World Bank recipient, Senegal, experienced a decline in status from free to partially 
free.  A decline in freedom status from partially free to not free was only manifested in 
two recipients of USAID and World Bank conditioned aid.  Both Djibouti and Ethiopia 
declined from partially free to not free in 2011 and in 2010, respectively. Nevertheless, 
none of the recipient countries of USAID and World Bank assistance saw their freedom 
status increase from partially free to free.   
Regardless of the 10 years of conditional aid donated by USAID and the World 
Bank, surprisingly, not a single African state experienced a rise in their status from 
partially free to free.  Aid conditionality and democracy assistance are thus insufficient to 
bringing about democracy consolidation to African states.  The concluding section will 
address the structural barriers to democratization and democracy consolidation in African 
political systems, and the limited effectiveness of democracy assistance to overcome 
these obstacles. 
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Conclusion 
 
The democratic wave that swept across Africa in the early 1990s took the West by 
surprise.  Africa was believed to lack the essential components that have historically 
contributed to democratic openings.  In a continent made up of low-income economies, 
African countries typically lacked a viable middle-class. Additionally, low literacy 
plagued these societies, and years of autocratic governance blocked a civic culture of 
popular participation (Brown and Kaiser 2008, 249).  However, the fall of the Soviet 
Union in 1989, with reforms to the aid policies of donors, provided a critical juncture for 
democratic openings in African countries. 
During the 1990s, the world witnessed a historic number of multi-party elections 
being held across the continent, and 29 African governments adopted new constitutions.
1
 
Nevertheless, despite these liberal political advancements, the full incorporation of 
democratic governance has been muted, giving way to a “deficit of democracy” 
throughout the continent.  Therefore, although the 1990s brought unprecedented 
democratic openings across the continent, backsliding towards illiberal governance has 
thwarted full consolidation of democracy in Africa.  In this section I will discuss the 
impediments to democracy in Africa, and furthermore, how these hindrances undermine 
the consolidation of liberal democratic governance.   
 
                                                          
1
 Angola, 1992; Benin, 1990; Burkina Faso, 1991; Burundi, 1992; Cape Verde, 1992; Central Africa 
Rebulic, 1995; Chad, 1996; Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), 1992; Democratic Republic of Congo 
(Kinshasa), 1993; Djibouti, 1992; Equatorial Guinea, 1991; Eritrea, 1996; Gabon, 1991; The Gambia, 
1997; Ghana, 1992; Lesotho, 1993; Malawi, 1994; Mali, 1992; Mauritania, 1991; Manibia, 1990; Niger, 
1999; Nigera, 1999; Rwanda, 1991; Setchelles, 1993; Sierra Leone, 1991; South Africa, 1996; Togo, 1991; 
Uganda, 1995; Zambia, 1991 (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency World Fact Book). 
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Challenges to Democracy  
Post-colonial African political systems have been afflicted with the legacy of 
autocratic governance.  In contrast to Western democracies, African democracies are 
generally structured to value the executive over other branches of government.  
Historically, following the independence of their respective states, popularly elected 
African presidents typically governed under what has become caricaturized as the Big 
Man Syndrome, where patron-client relationships were combined with authoritarian 
oppression to buffer the executive branch from political opposition.  Though many 
contemporary African states allow their citizens to freely exercise civil liberty, African 
political economies continue to be governed by elites that enjoy relatively unchecked 
authority and a great deal of discretion with regard to the allocation of public goods.  
Indeed, the concept of Neopatrimonialism pervades African political systems.  This 
system  and allows elected officials to distribute state resources in a manner that advances 
the personal prerogatives of the ruling elite, thereby undermining transparency, and thus 
implicating government accountability (Brown and Kaiser 2008, 249).  In conjunction 
with neopatrimonialism, the big man syndrome style of governance weakens systems of 
checks and balances, and thus the rule of law.  Despite democracy promotion efforts by 
the West, big man syndrome and neopatrimonialism, persist in African political systems 
and are antithetical to democracy.   
Next, the politicalization of ethnic identity impedes the development of robust 
democracy in sub-Saharan Africa.  Furthermore, in African countries political affiliation 
is centered upon ethnicity as opposed to social class or interest.  This renders elections a 
competition between ethnic groups for control of state resources, therefore exacerbating 
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neopatrimonialism.  The grave consequences of ethnic-based politics were witnessed in 
Kenya following the 2007 presidential election.  In retrospect that election can be 
characterized as a contest between the most prominent politicians of the country’s largest 
ethnic groups.  In 2007, President Mwai Kibaki of the Kikuyu community was 
challenged by Raila Odinga a Luo, the candidate of the Orange Democratic Party, a 
coalition made up of minority ethnic groups.  Although voter turnout was high, the 
election was highly disputed and widely recognized as flawed.  Nevertheless, Kibaki was 
declared the winner, and quickly sworn into his second term in office amid allegations of 
election tampering.  Immediately following the 2007 election, Kenya erupted in violence, 
and episodes of ethnic cleansing were carried out in the rural cities throughout the 
country.  The post-election conflict continued for nearly 100 days, and did not end until a 
power-sharing agreement was reached, which created the position of prime minister for 
Odinga.  Since the Kenyan constitution establishes the president as both the head of 
government and head of state, it was unclear what official duties would be entrusted to 
the prime minister.  
The violent aftermath of the 2007 election startled the international community.  
While Kenya, like most African countries, has a history of autocratic rule, it is widely 
recognized as being a stable country in East Africa, a region often plagued with conflict 
and state failure, Additionally, Kenya is a close ally of the United States and has enjoyed 
the benefits of partnering with America during the Cold War and the Global War on 
Terror. 
Nevertheless, the politicization of ethnic rivalries is not new to Kenya President 
Daniel arap Moi strategically fomented ethnic conflict to insulate himself from domestic 
 42 
 
and international appeals for democratic reforms.  This occurred in 1992 when Kenya 
held its first multiparty general election since independence in 1963.  Prior to the 1992 
general election, episodes of ethnic conflict were incited by Moi supporters in the Rift 
Valley region.  This was done strategically to display the turmoil the country would face 
if Moi were not returned to office.  As a result, Moi was re-elected in 1992 and served 
two additional terms until he exceeded his term limits in 2002.  The lack of a strong 
political party platform will continue to allow for the politicization of ethnicity, which 
will hamper the democratization of Africa states. 
Finally, the economic reality of African political systems affects the level of civil 
liberty an individual citizen can attain.  President Nelson Mandela of South Africa 
captured this reality when he stated, “Freedom is meaningless if people cannot put food 
in their stomachs” (Bratton and Mattes 2001, 447).  With the continent being composed 
of low-income political economies, individual citizens are preoccupied with ensuring 
their survival.  The average citizen is thus hindered from fully exercising the due 
diligence needed to hold their leaders accountable. In countries plagued with widespread 
poverty, pandemics, prolonged civil wars over natural resources, and ethnic conflict, 
democracy and the demand for greater accountability is a luxury that many Africans 
cannot readily afford (Collier 2007).  Moreover, rampant corruption and a general lack of 
transparency by African leaders are intended to keep the citizenry ignorant of the 
operation of government. 
These continent-specific realities, plus the absence of local government, leads to 
Delegative Democracy in African political systems (Bratton and Logan 2009).  Under 
this governing model, citizens elect parliamentarians from their ethno-regional 
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community and entrust to them not only political representation, but sole governing 
authority.  The drawback to delegative democracy is that elections can become a citizen’s 
only avenue to hold elected officials accountable (Bratton and Logan 2009).  With most 
African politicians enjoying 4- to 5-year terms, sporadic elections are weak instruments 
to hold leaders accountable.  The notion that Africans have become mere voters in 
elections rather than actively engaged citizens is a recurring theme in literature on 
democratization in Africa.  Arguably, these continent-specific realities help to explain 
why the role of citizen is not fully realized by Africans, and why liberal democracy, in its 
fullest form, remains beyond reach in states across the continent.  
 
Assessing the Consequences of Democracy Assistance in Africa: Findings from Kenya 
Several scholars argue that foreign aid has done nothing more than fund 
unsustainable democratic experiments in Africa.  They claim that democracy assistance 
can ultimately undermine democratization because politicians become answerable to 
donors instead of their constituents.  An additional common criticism of democracy 
assistance is that it causes quick transitions to electoral democracy before a foundation 
for liberal democratic governance can be established by domestic actors.   
 Although these may appear valid objections to democracy assistance, it should be 
recognized that the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 provided political movements within 
countries throughout the world the momentum, moral authority, as well as the critical 
juncture, to challenge authoritarian and autocratic regimes.  In the context of Africa, 
democracy assistance of the early 1990s provided desperately needed resources to civic 
agitation that had been brewing below the surface.  Although the initial wave of 
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multiparty elections held across Africa in the early 1990s did not instantly remove 
illiberal regimes, during this decade many African governments were put on paths to 
incorporate liberal political reforms.  
 Turning to Kenya, in 2006 I took part in a study abroad program at the University 
of Nairobi.  During my studies, I obtained a research affiliation with the National 
Convention Executive Council (NCEC).  Founded in 1997, the NCEC is the executive 
organ of the National Convention Assembly (NCA), a civic association composed of 
non-governmental organizations from various sectors of civil society.  Since its inception, 
the NCA has championed the adoption of liberal democratic political reforms and has 
stood at the forefront of the civic movement for a new Kenyan constitution.  During my 
tenure with the NCEC, I served as the Intern of Constitutional Reform Education and 
Advocacy.  Additionally, through my research affiliation I collaborated with the Kenya 
National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), Kenya’s statutory human rights 
agency.  During my time with these indigenous organizations, I participated in public 
forums and activities that were dedicated to ensuring a peaceful general election in 2007. 
 My field work in Kenya contributed to my undergraduate thesis: “Legalized 
Repression: A Case Study of the Kenyan Constitution and the Movement for Liberal 
Political Reform.” This paper utilized critical junction theory to examine the Kenyan 
constitution movement. My thesis argued that Kenya was presented with a constitutional 
moment following the 2002 election of President Kibaki, and that this opportunity was 
squandered due to illiberal, antithetical political interests.  Furthermore, I concluded that 
it was unlikely that Kenya would ever ratify an entirely new liberal democratic 
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constitution.  Rather, political leaders would continue to pragmatically amend the 
founding constitution in a piecemeal fashion to address reforms as they arose.   
 My prediction was proven wrong. The crisis which followed Kenya’s 2007 
presidential election demanded sweeping change as opposed to the gradual progressive 
amendments I had predicted almost a year earlier. The violent aftermath of the 2007 
presidential election again provided Kenya another constitutional moment.  In 2010, the 
Republic of Kenya held its second constitutional referendum, in which it ratified a new 
constitution founded upon the tenets of liberal democratic governance.   The adoption of 
a new Kenyan constitution marks progress for the country.  However, it is yet to be seen 
whether the principles of liberal governance will be fully embraced by Kenyan political 
leaders.   
The Kenyan constitution movement, in essence, captures the challenges in 
assessing the consequences of democracy assistance in Africa.   Democratization is a 
long and unsteady process that is being severely challenged by powerful domestic 
undercurrents seeking to maintain the status quo.  Furthermore, foreign aid in the form of 
democracy assistance will often fail to fully achieve the intended outcome set forth by 
donors.  In conclusion, given this reality, donors should conceptualize democracy 
assistance as a risky investment where returns are uncertain.    
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